
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
AVESTRUZES

PEC, AQUI
.
Taxa de 20% sobre mais-valias gera mais de 225 milhões por ano Dois escalões mais baixos ficam fora da limitação das deduções do IRS Segurança Social vai passar a calcular salários automaticamente Funcionários Públicos enfrentam "forte contenção" salarial Privatizações rendem mais em 2011 Exploração de linhas da CP entregues a privados Despesas em "outsourcing" limitadas a 90 milhões de euros Regra de três por um também vai ser aplicada aos carros do Estado Deduções à colecta de IRS passam a ser diferenciadas por escalões de rendimento Planos de pensões e saúde das empresas públicas vão ser cortados Limites de endividamento nas empresas públicas vão ser cortados para metade Teixeira dos Santos: Já é tempo de se começar a pagar nas Scut Prestações sociais sujeitas a avaliação do património e de rendimentos de capitais Governo vai cortar 95 milhões de euros às despesas com RSI em 2011 Governo vai rever critérios do subsídio de desemprego Rendimentos de gestores de empresas com prejuízos sujeitos a tributação autónoma Governo elimina benefícios fiscais nos seguros de acidentes pessoais e de vida Incentivos ao abate de veículos vão ficar reservados à compra de eléctricos Pequenos investidores escapam a taxa de 20% sobre mais-valias Funcionários públicos passam a reformar-se aos 65 anos a partir de 2012 Governo vai pôr à venda 17 empresas Vídeo: Há ou não aumento de impostos?
Rui Pedro Soares recebeu prémio de um milhão de euros REN vai atribuir prémio de desempenho a Penedos com votos contra dos privados Veja quanto receberam os administradores da PT em 2009
Monday, March 15, 2010
OPORTUNIDADE E LIDERANÇA
O País precisa de uma alternativa credível, toda a gente o diz, incluindo, por razões que também se percebem, os que governam. Precisaria em qualquer caso, mas precisa sobretudo no momento em que o carácter de quem governa é colocado em cheque a propósito das mais variadas e inexplicadas situações. 1. Os membros do Partido estão sujeitos à disciplina partidária, podendo ser-lhes aplicadas as seguintes sanções:
a. Advertência; b. Censura; c. Suspensão até um ano; d. Expulsão.
2. Três advertências equivalem automaticamente a uma pena de suspensão de três meses.
O JOGO DA CABRA CEGA
Processo do prédio em que Sócrates teve a primeira casa desapareceu da câmara
O processo de demolição interior e reconstrução do número 4 da Calçada Eng.º Miguel Pais, junto à Praça das Flores, desapareceu da Câmara de Lisboa.
Ingleses encontram novos factos que envolvem Sócrates no caso Freeport
Os investigadores ingleses encontraram um novo documento sobre o alegado pagamento de “luvas” no âmbito do licenciamento do Freeport e no qual aparece o nome do primeiro-ministro.
Sunday, March 14, 2010
ACERCA DE ESCOLHAS E PRIORIDADES
O GRANDE KEYNESIANO
Voltou a reafirmá-lo ontem no Congresso do seu partido: Fui sempre Keynesiano!
Desde que não lhe faltem com os fundos, quem não é?
Saturday, March 13, 2010
PECADOS
LEGITIMIDADE E LEGALIDADE
Friday, March 12, 2010
À ESPERA DA ALEMANHA - 4
By Wolfgang Schäuble
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Greece has reached a crossroads. For the first time, we in the eurozone are engaged in full surveillance over the fiscal and economic policy of one of the member countries of the European monetary union.
Greece’s case admonishes us to draw lessons for monetary union. My thoughts are in no way directed at the specific measures to stabilise Greece. Nor do they relate to discussions about the need for a form of economic government to provide improved co-ordination on economic policy throughout the European Union. My thinking focuses on making monetary union more resilient to a crisis.
The euro has shown itself to be a reliable anchor of stability in the crisis. It has protected us from intra-European currency turbulence that would otherwise have aggravated the situation in Europe. Nevertheless, we in the monetary union now face a decisive moment. The fallout from the crisis is becoming ever more visible, labour markets in some countries are languishing and government debt almost everywhere is far in excess of permissible deficit limits. There is only one course of action: all eurozone members must return to adherence to the stability and growth pact as rapidly as possible. I underline this message because I have the impression that global financial markets seem to be speaking far more plainly than many of the voices from the political sphere.
Grave structural weaknesses have been revealed in some euro area states – weaknesses that have to be addressed by a long, painful process of adjustment. Economic and fiscal policy surveillance in the eurozone was insufficient to prevent undesirable trends in a timely manner. We must therefore make more decisive use of the instruments available. From now on, a member state with an excessive deficit should not receive EU cohesion funds if it is not making sufficient savings.
It is obvious that the European body of regulations is still incomplete. Monetary union is unprepared for extremely severe situations of the type we are now seeing and that demand a comprehensive intervention to avert greater systemic risks. In the faith that budget surveillance was effective, the disequilibrium today was held to be inconceivable.
If we wish the euro to be strong and stable on a lasting basis – our condition for bringing the DM and its high credibility into the euro fold – we have to be prepared to integrate further in the eurozone. Co-ordination between euro members must be more far-reaching; they must take an active part in each other’s policymaking.
I understand that a great deal of political resistance will have to be surmounted. Nevertheless, I am convinced that from Germany’s perspective, European integration, monetary union and the euro are the only choice. What is decisive is Europeans’ ability to co-operate in partnership to deal with adversities. For the first time, it has become clear that a monetary union member with weak economic fundamentals can quickly lose the confidence of global financial markets in an acute budget crisis. This raises questions about how it would be possible to offer a member state support and simultaneously avert the threat of default when that country is consolidating its finances.
Traditionally these are tasks that the IMF has assumed in many crises, and it has produced strong results. For a member of the monetary union, this approach is not without problems because a central policy area, namely monetary policy, has been pooled. The involvement of the IMF is therefore being hotly debated. It is better for the eurozone member states to forearm themselves for such crises and augment their institutional framework. We could build on experience gained from use of the EU’s facility for medium-term financial aid to non-eurozone member states. In May 2009, the funding was topped up substantially on account of the considerable economic difficulties faced by some central and eastern European member states. This helped curb the consequences of a crisis.
Eurozone members could also be granted emergency liquidity aid from a “European monetary fund” to reduce the risk of defaults. Strict conditions and a prohibitive price tag must be attached so that aid is only drawn in the case of emergencies that present a threat to the financial stability of the whole euro area. This effect should be further reinforced by excluding the country concerned from the decision-making process – aid must be the last resort. Political decisions about aid should be taken in the Eurogroup in agreement with the ECB. Emergency aid could also be coupled on a mandatory basis with stricter sanctions within the framework of budget deficit proceedings. Monetary penalties could be imposed immediately and, once the aid and cooling-off period end, enforced against the member state without any recourse to reclaim the fine. The prospect of emergency aid connected with hard corrective fiscal action would boost the confidence of financial markets, thus preventing a deepening of the crisis and obviating the eurozone members’ need to call upon the IMF in future.
Emergency liquidity aid may never be taken for granted. It must, on principle, still be possible for a state to go bankrupt. Facing an unpleasant reality could be the better option in certain conditions. The monetary union and the euro are best protected if the eurozone remains credible and capable of taking action, even in difficult situations. This necessarily means suspending an unco-operative member state’s voting rights in the Eurogroup. A country whose finances are in disarray must not be allowed to participate in decisions regarding the finances of another euro member. Should a eurozone member ultimately find itself unable to consolidate its budgets or restore its competitiveness, this country should, as a last resort, exit the monetary union while being able to remain a member of the EU.
The voting rights of a eurozone member should furthermore be suspended for one year if infringement proceedings establish that this country intentionally breached European economic and monetary law. The true extent of the Greek budget disaster only became clear when the manipulated statistics were uncovered last autumn. I favour the EU statistical office Eurostat having the right to inspect all public accounts where suspicion of manipulation is substantiated.
Without doubt, it will take a great deal of political willpower to adapt the rules of monetary union speedily to suit the new realities. Yet there is no alternative to monetary union. There are some people who might feel that their scepticism towards the euro has been vindicated. They are overlooking the strengths of Europe and the problems faced in other leading global economic zones.
Greater calm is needed. The euro is the DM’s equal in terms of stability, there is little inflation and financing costs are generally low. The euro is now the second most important reserve and investment currency. A major reason is that financial markets have a great deal of trust in the ECB. To maintain this confidence, the crisis must be surmounted rapidly. This credibility is advantageous to the monetary union in overcoming the financial crisis. If we are successful in putting fiscal policies in the member states back on the right course, the crisis will have brought about a change for the better.
The writer is the German finance minister
PIIGSU
"I am becoming convinced that Great Britain is the next country that is going to be pummelled by investors," said Kornelius Purps, Unicredit 's fixed income director and a leading analyst in Germany.
"Britain's AAA-rating is highly at risk. The budget deficit is huge at 13pc of GDP and investors are not happy. The outgoing government is inactive due to the election. There will have to be absolute cuts in public salaries or pay, but nobody is talking about that," he told The Daily Telegraph.
"Sterling is going to fall further over coming months. I am not expecting a crash of the gilts market but we may see a further rise in spreads of 30 to 50 basis points."
Yields on 10-year gilts have already crept up to 4.14pc, compared to 3.94pc for Italian bonds, 3.48pc for French bonds, and 3.19pc for German Bunds, though part of this reflects worries about higher inflation in Britain.
Ian Stannard, currency strategist at BNP Paribas, said markets are fretting over how the UK will cover its deficit following the pause in quantitative easing by the Bank of England. The Bank has absorbed £200bn of debt, more than total Treasury issuance over the last year.
À ESPERA DA ALEMANHA - 3
COISAS COMPLICADAS
Thursday, March 11, 2010
ESCÂNDALO
A oposição vai aprovar a inscrição no OE de cinco milhões de euros para pagar remunerações dos presidentes de junta, perante as críticas do ministro Teixeira dos Santos.
Oposição aprova, com voto contra do PS, cinco milhões de euros para pagar a presidentes de junta
A CULPA DA ALEMANHA
Wednesday, March 10, 2010
FME - EMF
Germany's eurozone crisis nightmare Ever since the federal republic was founded, Germany has had two over-riding strategic objectives: sound money and European integration. These were the twin imperatives learned from the calamities of the early 20th century. The euro embodies these aims. Now they conflict with each other.
Is the right answer to rescue sinners, thereby strengthening the cohesion of the eurozone, but threatening monetary stability? Or is it to let sinners default, thereby strengthening monetary credibility, but weakening cohesion? Germany could avoid such choices before the single currency: uncompetitive countries simply devalued.
Unfortunately, the domestic German debate assumes, wrongly, that the answer is for every member to become like Germany itself. But Germany can be Germany – an economy with fiscal discipline, feeble domestic demand and a huge export surplus – only because others are not. Its current economic model violates the universalisability principle of Germany’s greatest philosopher, Immanuel Kant.
The idea that countries are in difficulty because of their own sloppiness is easy to reach in the case of Greece. According to the latest Economic Outlook from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, gross public debt was 115 per cent of gross domestic product last year, the general government deficit was 12.7 per cent of GDP and the current account deficit was 11.1 per cent.
This, then, would be a classic case for intervention by the International Monetary Fund. Normally, the latter would offer temporary liquidity support in return for a devaluation and fiscal stringency. Yet the German government rejects the idea that an outside body should dictate policy to a country that shares Germany’s money. It suggests, instead, that a European Monetary Fund should be created, to provide conditional liquidity support. Under the direction of the other members of the eurozone, the EMF would dictate fiscal policy to the sinner.
Members of the German government also want penalties to be imposed. Among the ideas are: suspension of European Union subsidies, the “cohesion funds”, to countries that fail to observe fiscal discipline; suspension of voting rights in ministerial meetings; and even suspension from the eurozone. A less controversial idea is to enforce fines already permitted under the EU’s “stability and growth pact”.
Greece is a special case. Today’s fiscal excesses are not the result of fiscal indiscipline, but of private indiscipline. The latter, moreover, was an inherent element in the workings of the eurozone itself. It is how the eurozone economy balanced, at a reasonable level of overall demand, in the pre-crisis period.
The point is best understood from the financial balances of eurozone members in 2006, before the crisis, and 2009, at its height (see charts). The balance between income and expenditure in the private, government and foreign sectors must sum to zero. In 2006, Germany, the Netherlands and Austria ran huge private surpluses, relative to GDP, while the private sectors of Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain ran huge deficits. Fiscal positions seemed under control everywhere: Ireland and Spain even ran substantial (albeit illusory) fiscal surpluses. Meanwhile, the private surpluses of Germany and the Netherlands were offset by huge capital outflows. In all, we see private disequilibria, but the illusion of fiscal stability, with countries more or less in line with treaty criteria for fiscal deficits.
Let me put the point starkly: Germany’s structural private sector and current account surpluses make it virtually impossible for its neighbours to eliminate their fiscal deficits, unless the latter are willing to live with lengthy slumps. The problem could be resolved by a eurozone move into external surpluses. I wonder how the eurozone would explain such a policy to its global partners. It might also be resolved by an expansionary monetary policy from the European Central Bank that successfully spurred private spending in the surplus countries and also raised German inflation well above the eurozone average.
Germany is in a trap of its own devising. It wants its neighbours to be as like itself as possible. They cannot be, because its deficient domestic demand cannot be universalised. As another great German philosopher, Hegel, might have said, the German thesis demanded a Spanish antithesis. Now that the private sector’s bubble has burst, the synthesis is a eurozone fiscal disaster. Ironically, Germany must become less German if the eurozone is to become more so.
2010 ECONOMIC FORECAST
2010 Economic Forecast, Commonwealth Club,
San Francisco, CA, January 22, 2010
