Saturday, April 19, 2025
POR UM CESTO DE DEPLORÁVEIS
Sunday, December 15, 2024
SE É PROIBIDO VER, VEJA-SE!
***
"O filme, com uma intimidade preciosa e frágil numa sociedade opressiva, foi proibido no Irão e as autoridades confiscaram os passaportes dos realizadores, que também estão impedidos de filmar " . Jornal Medeia Nimas
Wednesday, October 16, 2024
O VALOR DOS VALORES MORAIS
Anteontem a Real Academia Sueca de Ciências anunciou a atribuição do Nobel das Ciências Económicas em Memória de Alfredo Nobel, mais conhecido como Nobel da Economia, a Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, do Massachusets Intitute of Technology (MIT) e James Robinson, da Universidade de Chicago,
“for studies of how institutions are formed and affect prosperity”
(Transcrevo do Press release, distribuído após a divulgação dos nomes dos laureados, de sínteses dos trabalhos realizados, seguidas de perguntas da audiência presente no acto e respostas de Daron Acemoglu - LIVE: Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson win Nobel Prize 2024 for Economic Sciences)
They have helped us understand differences in prosperity between nations
This year’s laureates in the economic sciences – Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson – have demonstrated the importance of societal institutions for a country’s prosperity. Societies with a poor rule of law and institutions that exploit the population do not generate growth or change for the better. The laureates’ research helps us understand why.
When Europeans colonised large parts of the globe, the institutions in those societies changed. This was sometimes dramatic, but did not occur in the same way everywhere. In some places the aim was to exploit the indigenous population and extract resources for the colonisers’ benefit. In others, the colonisers formed inclusive political and economic systems for the long-term benefit of European migrants.
The laureates have shown that one explanation for differences in countries’ prosperity is the societal institutions that were introduced during colonisation. Inclusive institutions were often introduced in countries that were poor when they were colonised, over time resulting in a generally prosperous population. This is an important reason for why former colonies that were once rich are now poor, and vice versa.
Some countries become trapped in a situation with extractive institutions and low economic growth. The introduction of inclusive institutions would create long-term benefits for everyone, but extractive institutions provide short-term gains for the people in power. As long as the political system guarantees they will remain in control, no one will trust their promises of future economic reforms. According to the laureates, this is why no improvement occurs.
However, this inability to make credible promises of positive change can also explain why democratisation sometimes occurs. When there is a threat of revolution, the people in power face a dilemma. They would prefer to remain in power and try to placate the masses by promising economic reforms, but the population are unlikely to believe that they will not return to the old system as soon as the situation settles down. In the end, the only option may be to transfer power and establish democracy.
“Reducing the vast differences in income between countries is one of our time’s greatest challenges. The laureates have demonstrated the importance of societal institutions for achieving this,” says Jakob Svensson, Chair of the Committee for the Prize in Economic Sciences.
Saturday, September 28, 2024
PODE UM (EX) BOMBEIRO INCENDIAR O MUNDO?
A pergunta não tem intuitos sensacionalistas porque decorre do muito diversificado sistema de eleição do presidente dos Estados Unidos da América, que não está sujeito a regras idênticas em todos os EUA e também não são claras as regras de validação da votação sobretudo nos casos de votação antecipada por correspondência, já a decorrer. Em qualquer caso persistem condições para emergirem dos resultados da votação em 5 de novembro confrontos irredutíveis, incompreensíveis na democracia mais antiga da era moderna e, ainda, a maior potência mundial.
Em 21 de dezembro do ano passado, coloquei uma nota neste caderno de apontamentos - BIBEN NÃO SERÁ REELEITO, TRUMP TAMBÉM NÃO - sustentada num artigo publicado aqui, "Why neither Biden nor Trump will be the next president".
Friday, July 19, 2024
MÁS NOTÍCIAS PARA OS EURÓFAGOS*
Ursula von der Leyen reeleita presidente da Comissão Europeia.
"Horas antes, num discurso proferido no Parlamento Europeu, em Estrasburgo, Von der Leyen atacou Viktor Orbán – sem citar o nome do primeiro-ministro da Hungria – pela recente deslocação a Moscovo logo após o arranque da presidência rotativa do país do Conselho da UE. “A Rússia está a contar que a Europa e o Ocidente se tornem moles” e o problema é que “alguns na Europa estão a alinhar”, afirmou."
Sunday, June 09, 2024
BRANCO OU TINTO
Valeu o meu apontamento de ontem - O QUE VALE O MEU VOTO? - um comentário, pertinente, que, no entanto, não responde à questão em causa.
"... O voto de cada um de nós vale efectivamente uma quota numericamente insignificante, mas isso é a essência dos regimes democráticos, onde ninguém, por mais poderoso que seja do ponto de vista político, económico ou religioso, tem um voto com maior significado do que qualquer um dos outros votos !!!! Omitir esta verdade, seja a que pretexto for, é como que um convite à abstenção do acto eleitoral !"
| A propósito de eleições europeias, encontrei no meu arquivo de recortes de imprensa alguns comentários sobre o livro de Saramago, publicado há vinte anos - Ensaio sobre a Lucidez - um ano em que Saramago integrou a lista de candidatos da CDU ao Parlamento Europeu "em lugar não ilegível, simplesmente como uma expressão de fidelidade ao PCP ", segundo o secretário-geral do partido nessa altura. | | ||||||||||||||||||||
(cartoon de Vasco)
Saturday, June 08, 2024
O QUE VALE O MEU VOTO?
THE WAY WE LIVE NOW: 11-06-05: FREAKONOMICS
Why Vote?
·
Top of Form
Bottom of Form
By Stephen J. Dubner and Steven D. Levitt
· Nov. 6, 2005
A Swiss Turnout-Boosting Experiment
Within the economics departments at certain universities, there is a famous but probably apocryphal story about two world-class economists who run into each other at the voting booth.
"What are you doing here?" one asks.
"My wife made me come," the other says.
The first economist gives a confirming nod. "The same."
After a mutually sheepish moment, one of them hatches a plan: "If you promise never to tell anyone you saw me here, I'll never tell anyone I saw you." They shake hands, finish their polling business and scurry off.
Why would an
economist be embarrassed to be seen at the voting booth? Because voting exacts
a cost -- in time, effort, lost productivity -- with no discernible payoff
except perhaps some vague sense of having done your "civic duty." As
the economist Patricia Funk wrote in a recent paper, "A rational
individual should abstain from voting."
The odds that your vote will actually affect the outcome of a given election are very, very, very slim. This was documented by the economists Casey Mulligan and Charles Hunter, who analyzed more than 56,000 Congressional and state-legislative elections since 1898. For all the attention paid in the media to close elections, it turns out that they are exceedingly rare. The median margin of victory in the Congressional elections was 22 percent; in the state-legislature elections, it was 25 percent. Even in the closest elections, it is almost never the case that a single vote is pivotal. Of the more than 40,000 elections for state legislator that Mulligan and Hunter analyzed, comprising nearly 1 billion votes, only 7 elections were decided by a single vote, with 2 others tied. Of the more than 16,000 Congressional elections, in which many more people vote, only one election in the past 100 years -- a 1910 race in Buffalo -- was decided by a single vote.
But there is a more important point: the closer an election is, the more likely that its outcome will be taken out of the voters' hands -- most vividly exemplified, of course, by the 2000 presidential race. It is true that the outcome of that election came down to a handful of voters; but their names were Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas. And it was only the votes they cast while wearing their robes that mattered, not the ones they may have cast in their home precincts.
Still, people do continue to vote, in the millions. Why? Here are three possibilities:
1. Perhaps we are just not very bright and therefore wrongly believe that our votes will affect the outcome.
2. Perhaps we vote in the same spirit in which we buy lottery tickets. After all, your chances of winning a lottery and of affecting an election are pretty similar. From a financial perspective, playing the lottery is a bad investment. But it's fun and relatively cheap: for the price of a ticket, you buy the right to fantasize how you'd spend the winnings -- much as you get to fantasize that your vote will have some impact on policy.
3. Perhaps we
have been socialized into the voting-as-civic-duty idea, believing that it's a
good thing for society if people vote, even if it's not particularly good for
the individual. And thus we feel guilty for not voting.
But wait a minute, you say. If everyone thought about voting the way economists do, we might have no elections at all. No voter goes to the polls actually believing that her single vote will affect the outcome, does she? And isn't it cruel to even suggest that her vote is not worth casting?
This is indeed a slippery slope -- the seemingly meaningless behavior of an individual, which, in aggregate, becomes quite meaningful. Here's a similar example in reverse. Imagine that you and your 8-year-old daughter are taking a walk through a botanical garden when she suddenly pulls a bright blossom off a tree.
"You shouldn't do that," you find yourself saying.
"Why not?" she asks.
"Well," you reason, "because if everyone picked one, there wouldn't be any flowers left at all."
"Yeah, but everybody isn't picking them," she says with a look. "Only me."
In the old days, there were more pragmatic incentives to vote. Political parties regularly paid voters $5 or $10 to cast the proper ballot; sometimes payment came in the form of a keg of whiskey, a barrel of flour or, in the case of an 1890 New Hampshire Congressional race, a live pig.
Now as then, many people worry about low voter turnout -- only slightly more than half of eligible voters participated in the last presidential election -- but it might be more worthwhile to stand this problem on its head and instead ask a different question: considering that an individual's vote almost never matters, why do so many people bother to vote at all?
The answer may lie in Switzerland. That's where Patricia Funk discovered a wonderful natural experiment that allowed her to take an acute measure of voter behavior.
The Swiss love to vote -- on parliamentary elections, on plebiscites, on whatever may arise. But voter participation had begun to slip over the years (maybe they stopped handing out live pigs there too), so a new option was introduced: the mail-in ballot. Whereas each voter in the U.S. must register, that isn't the case in Switzerland. Every eligible Swiss citizen began to automatically receive a ballot in the mail, which could then be completed and returned by mail.
From a social scientist's perspective, there was beauty in the setup of this postal voting scheme: because it was introduced in different cantons (the 26 statelike districts that make up Switzerland) in different years, it allowed for a sophisticated measurement of its effects over time.
Never again would any Swiss voter have to tromp to the polls during a rainstorm; the cost of casting a ballot had been lowered significantly. An economic model would therefore predict voter turnout to increase substantially. Is that what happened?
Not at all. In
fact, voter turnout often decreased, especially in smaller cantons and in the
smaller communities within cantons. This finding may have serious implications
for advocates of Internet voting -- which, it has long been argued, would make
voting easier and therefore increase turnout. But the Swiss model indicates
that the exact opposite might hold true.
Why is this the case? Why on earth would fewer people vote when the cost of doing so is lowered?
It goes back to the incentives behind voting. If a given citizen doesn't stand a chance of having her vote affect the outcome, why does she bother? In Switzerland, as in the U.S., "there exists a fairly strong social norm that a good citizen should go to the polls," Funk writes. "As long as poll-voting was the only option, there was an incentive (or pressure) to go to the polls only to be seen handing in the vote. The motivation could be hope for social esteem, benefits from being perceived as a cooperator or just the avoidance of informal sanctions. Since in small communities, people know each other better and gossip about who fulfills civic duties and who doesn't, the benefits of norm adherence were particularly high in this type of community."
In other words, we do vote out of self-interest -- a conclusion that will satisfy economists -- but not necessarily the same self-interest as indicated by our actual ballot choice. For all the talk of how people "vote their pocketbooks," the Swiss study suggests that we may be driven to vote less by a financial incentive than a social one. It may be that the most valuable payoff of voting is simply being seen at the polling place by your friends or co-workers.
Unless, of course, you happen to be an economist.
THE WAY WE LIVE NOW: 11-06-05: FREAKONOMICS Stephen J. Dubner and Steven D. Levitt are the authors of "Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything." More information on the academic research behind this column is at www.freakonomics.com.
