AFIRMA MÜNCHAU

Don’t blame Moody’s for a messy euro crisis

By Wolfgang Münchau

You can always gauge the temperature of the eurozone crisis by the blame game. Last week, the cacophony briefly subsided when everybody who mattered accused the rating agencies of engaging in an anti-European conspiracy. This was the day after Moody’s downgraded Portugal to junk. The fury of the reaction tells me that the process is in real trouble, once again.

The most interesting aspect of Moody’s rating was not the downgrade itself, but the reasoning. Moody’s expects that Portugal, like Greece, will need another loan. Moody’s also expects that the politics will be just as messy. Will not the Germans again seek private-sector participation as a condition? Of course they will. Moody’s concluded, rightly in my view, that the messy European Union politics constitutes a reason for concern. Having observed this crisis from the start, I agree. This is as much a crisis of policy co-ordination as it is a debt crisis.

Shortly before Moody’s downgrade, Standard & Poor’s pronounced that the French proposal for a debt rollover would, if implemented, constitute a selective default. If you add together S&P and Moody’s comments, you get a sense of the disturbing dynamic that lies ahead. Say, the eurozone governments decided to force Greece to default on part of its debt, and the rating agencies were to attach a selective default rating to Greek government bonds. If you expect, as Moody’s does, that Portugal will end up in the same position as Greece – having to request a follow-up loan – then the same private-sector participation rules would also apply to Portugal. Portugal would also receive a selective default rating at some point. Ireland will probably also need a second programme. I am not surprised at all that bond markets have been revaluing Spanish and Italian bonds. Neither country is in danger of defaulting, but their ratings will be dragged down to junk level if the periphery defaults.

Everybody hates the rating agencies and no one hates them more than the Europeans. The rating agencies were, without a doubt, an important contributing factor to the credit bubble. But last week, they did us a favour. They showed that populism will not work. The European Central Bank is absolutely right on this. A Greek default will unleash a dynamic process that will threaten the eurozone’s financial stability, even its very survival.

The impasse leaves us with a single solution in the short run – and a single solution in the long run. The two are, in fact, the same. In the short run, the only way to bring the private sector into a voluntary scheme is a debt swap, to be organised by the European financial stability facility. That is currently not possible because the EFSF is not allowed to purchase bonds in secondary markets. Germany, in particular would have to change its position on this issue. But the Germans are among those who are pushing the hardest for private-sector participation. I would not be surprised if they changed their mind again – as they have been doing time and again in the past 18 months.

If the rules on the EFSF were relaxed, it could offer to buy up Greek debt at a discount, say 20 per cent, in exchange for its own AAA-rated bonds. The sellers would have to register a loss, but at least they end up with good securities. There would be no reason for the rating agencies to act.

In the long run, the only solution is a eurozone bond, which you can think of as an extended secondary-market purchase programme by the EFSF. This is why the short-term and long-term solutions are identical. Of course, it will not be called a eurozone bond. The Germans had a wonderful euphemism to describe the debt they raised to pay for unification: Sondervermögen, or “special wealth”. The EU will come up with a similarly misleading name. let us not kid ourselves however: a eurozone bond it will be.

Last week, a group of former European prime ministers proposed in the Financial Times the use of the European Investment Bank to issue eurozone bonds. This is an intriguing idea. It would have the major advantage that it would not require any changes to the European Treaties, at least not for now. The most important technical point is that the eurozone bond, or whatever it is called, would be issued on a “joint and several” basis. This means that everybody is responsible for the whole amount – similar to an overdraft in a joint bank account.

Do not think of it as something utopian, something that electorates have to approve in a referendum. On the contrary. The eurozone bond is – literally – the default option in this crisis. It is what will happen when nothing happens. If governments face the choice between the eurozone bond or an intrastate fiscal transfer, they will choose the former. Germany will not only accept it. Germany will propose it.

We have to thank the rating agencies for giving the eurozone’s policymakers a clearer vision of which strategies are feasible, and which are not. It is now time to get serious.