O artigo de Martin Wolf e o seu suscitam muitas perspectivas de reflexão. Contenho-me em duas, de forma tão sucinta quanto possível:
- A perda de competitividade das exportações portuguesas causada pela valorização do euro;
- O euro é indispensável à União Europeia?
Quanto ao primeiro ponto, tem sido defendido por alguns (talvez muitos) que o euro é o grande responsável pela perda de competitividade das produções tradicionais portuguesas, nomeadamente as confecções e os têxteis.
Não pode negar-se que, até certo ponto, assim é. Mas é por demais evidente que seria preciso admitir uma desvalorização forte da nossa moeda de facturação para poder ajustar-se competitivamente do lado monetário à concorrência das economias chinesa e indiana, por exemplo.
E daqui passo ao segundo ponto.
Martin Wolf refere a Suécia, a Dinamarca, o Reino Unido que, aparentemente foram bem sucedidas por se manterem fora do sistema.
Ora, todos sabemos que as moedas desses países têm gravitado à volta do valor do euro. Nem poderia ser de outro modo. Uma desvalorização "competitiva" seria uma derrogação da eliminação das fronteiras alfandegárias entre os países membros.
Aliás, Martin Wolf poderia, mas não o fez, referir a Finlândia, um caso de sucesso dentro do euro.
Acredito muito convictamente que Portugal tem muito a ganhar com a sua condição de membro da UE e o facto de estar no euro obriga-nos
a um exercício exigente de adaptação que será muito demorado. Entretanto, como qualquer corpo desabituado de competição a alto nível, temos as nossas cãibras colectivas.
Não creio, portanto, que tenhamos alternativa senão realizar os ajustamentos necessários ao cumprimento das regras que nos garantem a permanência no sistema.
Ou melhor: alternativa temos, mas não é lá grande coisa. Tal e qual a vida para além do défice.
"A full decade after Europe's leaders took the decision to launch the euro, we have good reason to be proud of our single currency. The Economic and Monetary Union and the euro are a major success." Self-congratulation is in order at birthday parties. So nobody should be surprised at the effusive remarks in the foreword by Joaquín Almunia, commissioner for economic and monetary affairs, to an excellent study of "Emu@10" (sic).*
How could anybody dare to question the achievements of the single currency? It is considered a credible rival to the US dollar. Jeffrey Frankel of Harvard even predicted in March that the "euro could replace the dollar within 10 years".** This is a far cry from the scepticism, particularly in English-speaking circles, that greeted both its launch and the subsequent period of declining value against the US dollar. This is a credible currency.
The successes are indeed obvious: the European Central Bank has established itself as a credible central bank and plausible rival to the Federal Reserve; annual inflation in the eurozone's member countries averaged 2.2 per cent a year between 1999 and early 2008, against 3.3 per cent between 1989 and 1998; the fiscal deficit fell to 0.6 per cent of gross domestic product last year, compared with an average of 4 per cent in the 1980s and 1990s; nominal and real interest rates have both been lower than for several decades; intra-area trade flows now account for a third of the eurozone's GDP, up from a quarter 10 years ago; and financial integration has proceeded apace, with the 16 largest banking groups holding more than 25 per cent of their assets outside their home countries.
It is little wonder, then, that the euro has recovered so strongly against the dollar and that in real terms a (synthetic) euro is at its highest since 1970, according to JPMorgan. It is little wonder that the euro's share of disclosed foreign currency reserves rose from 18 per cent in 1999 to more than 25 per cent in 2007. It is little wonder, too, that the membership of the eurozone has risen to 15 from the initial 11, with more in the wings.
Yet all is not rosy. According to the Commission, real GDP per head grew at only 1.6 per cent a year between 1999 and 2008, down from 1.9 per cent between 1989 and 1998 and well below the 2.2 per cent in Denmark, Sweden and the UK, the three established members of the European Union to remain outside. Labour productivity grew at only 0.8 per cent a year, down from 1.6 per cent between 1989 and 1998 and well below the 1.6 per cent in the US between 1999 and 2008. The unemployment rate fell, but is still far above levels in the other three member states and the US.
The conclusion, then, is that the eurozone is a triumph as a monetary union. Yet it is much less so as an economic union. At the very least, its creation has not caused the acceleration in dynamism that proponents hoped for. If anything, structural reforms have slowed.
Moreover, as the euro soars, the pressures of adjustment to internal divergence are likely to grow to enormous levels. The report is honest about these challenges. Between 1999 and 2007, huge divergences in inflation, relative unit labour costs and current account positions emerged (see charts). These tendencies were exacerbated by the divergence in real interest rates, with the lowest rates in the countries with the highest inflation and - perversely, but inevitably - the strongest economies.
The stories here are two: the divergence in relative unit labour costs between Germany, on the one hand, and Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy, on the other; and the scale of the credit-fuelled property booms in Spain and Ireland. Spain is the most important example: it has had an enormous property boom, with residential investment reaching 13 per cent of GDP, and huge current account deficits, which peaked at 10 per cent of GDP. Yet Italy, which has suffered from chronically weak growth, instead, also has significant competitiveness problems.
How might these adjustments play out? The answer partly depends on what happens in the eurozone as a whole. The probabilities are that growth will slow sharply in the short term, under the pressures of a high exchange rate, the transfers of income abroad generated by high commodity prices and the ECB's efforts to keep inflation under control.
Meanwhile, the peripheral countries will confront closely related structural and cyclical challenges. The cyclical one, particularly relevant to Spain, is to find new sources of demand, now that the credit boom has run its course; the structural one is to recover lost competitiveness. The two objectives tend to merge in the case of members of a currency union, since these have no monetary policy of their own and limited room for fiscal manoeuvre. So durable recovery will also need big improvements in external competitiveness.
When the euro itself is so strong, this is going to be hard to achieve. Assume, for argument's sake, that trend productivity growth in the production of tradable goods and services is the same in Spain or Italy as in Germany. Then any improvements in competitiveness demand lower wage increases. A 10 per cent improvement in relative unit labour costs would demand a 10 per cent decline in relative wages. If that were to happen over, say, five years, nominal wage increases would probably have to be in the 0-1 per cent range. Little short of a recession is likely to generate that result.
The optimist would argue that the periphery has only to do what Germany itself did in the early years of Emu. The pessimist would note that Germany's growth averaged only 0.6 per cent between 2001 and 2005 (inclusive). The pessimist might add that Germany's self-discipline is legendary and the underlying strength of its manufacturing sector second to none. The pessimist might conclude by noting the behaviour of Europe's national politicians. Many seem to have believed, or at least hoped, that Emu entry was the end of a tough process, rather than the beginning of one. This is not to argue that the adjustment ahead is impossible, but to stress the scale of the challenge.
Emu has been managed as successfully as such a union could be. For this those involved deserve plaudits. If this success were to continue in the decades ahead, the euro would surely become an ever more important global currency. But the success of the eurozone is not a technical matter. It will demand very tough choices. It will only be assured if overall performance improves and internal adjustment works smoothly. So can we conclude that Emu is a triumph? It is still too soon to tell.
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