Não sei não.
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Para a generalidade dos comentadores a coisa está entre o cinzento claro e o preto. As perdas reconhecidas pelas instituições financeiras – 20 mil milhões de dólares – é apenas a ponta de um iceberg que atingirá as centenas de milhares de milhões de dólares.Mas esta é uma parcela ínfima dos valores que estão em jogo não só em hipotecas sub prime mas também near prime e prime, para onde a vaga de incumprimentos se está estender. E que se espraia pelos cartões de crédito, crédito para compra de automóvel, etc.
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Ouvem-se estas notícias e não podemos deixar de reparar para o nosso umbigo. Para concluir que também à volta dele circulam ameaças.Com a dívida externa que já atingimos em Portugal, a dúvida persiste: onde irão os bancos arranjar imaginação para continuar a subir degraus de dois dígitos?E se perderem a passada irão escorregar pela escada abaixo?
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The amount of losses that financial institutions have already recognized - $20 billion – is just the very tip of the iceberg of much larger losses that will end up in the hundreds of billions of dollars. At stake – in subprime alone – is about a trillion of sub-prime related RMBS and hundreds of billions of mortgage related CDOs. But calling this crisis a sub-prime meltdown is ludicrous as by now the contagion has seriously spread to near prime and prime mortgages. And it is spreading to subprime and near prime credit cards and auto loans where deliquencies are rising and will sharply rise further in the year ahead. And it is spreading to every corner of the securitized financial system that is either frozen or on the way to freeze: CDOs issuance is near dead; the LBO market – and the related leveraged loans market – is piling deals that have been postponed, restructured or cancelled; the liquidity squeeze in the interbank market – especially at the one month to three months maturities - is continuing; the losses that banks and investment banks will experience in the next few quarters will erode their Tier 1 capital ratio; the ABCP and related SIV sectors are near dead and unraveling; and since the Super-conduit will flop the only options are those of bringing those SIV assets on balance sheet (with significant capital and liquidity effects) or sell them at a large loss; similar problems and crunches are emerging in the CLO, CMO and CMBS markets; junk bonds spreads are widening and corporate default rates will soon start to rise. Every corner of the securitization world is now under severe stress, including so called highly rated and “safe” (AAA and AA) securities.
The reality is that most financial institutions – banks, commercial banks, pension funds, hedge funds – have barely started to recognize the lower “fair value” of their impaired securities. Valuation of illiquid assets is a most complex issue; but starting with the November 15th adoption of FASB 157 the leeway that financial institutions have used so far for creative accounting will be much more limited.
The reality is that most financial institutions – banks, commercial banks, pension funds, hedge funds – have barely started to recognize the lower “fair value” of their impaired securities. Valuation of illiquid assets is a most complex issue; but starting with the November 15th adoption of FASB 157 the leeway that financial institutions have used so far for creative accounting will be much more limited.
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