Thursday, February 18, 2010
NÃO SE RIAM - 2
O artigo que hoje transcrevo aqui de Will Hutton, na íntegra por receio de poder deixar de estar acessível dentro de algum tempo, merece uma leitura muito atenta. Sem dizer nada de surpreendentemente novo, Will Hutton consegue num texto relativamente curto caracterizar no fundamental as linhas por onde circula o sistema monetário europeu e, por tabela, a União Europeia, o vasto alcance das consequências negativas de descarrilamentos localizados e as medidas que se impõem para prevenir ou, pelo menos minorar, os riscos de ocorrência desses acidentes. Porque ninguém está livre do impacto das consequências de um desastre financeiro localizado quando a interligação é global. Aqueles que no Reino Unido, a começar pelo seu Primeiro-Ministro, supõem estar ao abrigo dos estilhaços da bancarrota grega, Will Hutton avisa:
Não se riam. A nossa interdependência é uma crescente realidade política e económica. Os britânicos compraram um quinto das obrigações gregas. Se a Grécia entrar em incumprimento os incobráveis terão um severo impacto tanto no sistema bancário britânico como em qualquer outro europeu.
É também muito elucidativa a resenha que Will Hutton faz das causas subjacentes à debilidade das estruturas financeiras gregas. Portugal, em grande parte, pode ver-se ao espelho ali naquele retrato.
Há dias, Krugman, num artigo que transcrevi também na íntegra aqui, afirmava que "o que está realmente por detrás da euroconfusão não é o esbanjamento dos seus políticos mas a arrogância das suas elites, especificamente das elites políticas que levaram a Europa a adoptar uma moeda única muito antes de estarem reunidas as condições necessárias a essa acção." Quase a concluir esse artigo, Krugman, afirma que "o único caminho a seguir é o caminho em frente: para que o euro possa funcionar a Europa tem de avançar para uma união política, de modo que as nações europeias passem a funcionar de forma idêntica à dos Estados Unidos da América. " Para terminar dizendo que não acredita, no entanto, que esse seja o caminho que os europeus vão adoptar.
Discordo de Krugman.
Primeiro, porque, se ele pensa, e eu concordo nesse ponto com ele, que dificilmente a Europa vai evoluir dentro de pouco tempo para uma federação de estados idêntica aos EUA, quando as circunstâncias parecem empurrar fortemente nesse sentido, como é que poderiam reunir-se as condições que ele considera necessárias na ausência de qualquer compromisso inicial? Se o casal não casa e a mulher está grávida como é que casaria se nem namorassem?
.
Por outro lado, a comparação com os EUA não me parece a mais adequada. Diz Krugman que, no caso de uma crise económica provocada pelo rebentamento de uma bolha especulativa como aconteceu em Espanha, a solução para uma ocorrência idêntica na Flórida teria o respaldo dos fundos federais norte-americanos. Teria até certo ponto. A Califórnia debate-se com sérios problemas já há alguns anos e a ajuda federal não tem fluído como pretenderia o Governador Schwarzenegger.
A entreajuda tem os seus limites e os custos da irresponsabilidade de uns não podem ser impostos a outros. Mesmo uma Federação, mesmo uma Nação até, não sobrevive sem disciplina que obrigue a comportamentos sociais que sustentem a coesão. Alberto João Jardim tem obtido o que quer porque usa sistematicamente a chantagem mas mesmo esta não é sustentável ad eternum. Um dia a papa acaba.
.
Também sou partidário deuma solução federalista mas não penso que essa seja a panaceia para a solução dos problemas europeus, do euro, e muito particularmente para os nossos.
Don´t laugh at Europe´s woes. The travails facing Greece are also ours
Will Hutton The Observer
NÃO SE RIAM - 2
O artigo que hoje transcrevo aqui de Will Hutton, na íntegra por receio de poder deixar de estar acessível dentro de algum tempo, merece uma leitura muito atenta. Sem dizer nada de surpreendentemente novo, Will Hutton consegue num texto relativamente curto caracterizar no fundamental as linhas por onde circula o sistema monetário europeu e, por tabela, a União Europeia, o vasto alcance das consequências negativas de descarrilamentos localizados e as medidas que se impõem para prevenir ou, pelo menos minorar, os riscos de ocorrência desses acidentes. Porque ninguém está livre do impacto das consequências de um desastre financeiro localizado quando a interligação é global. Aqueles que no Reino Unido, a começar pelo seu Primeiro-Ministro, supõem estar ao abrigo dos estilhaços da bancarrota grega, Will Hutton avisa:
Não se riam. A nossa interdependência é uma crescente realidade política e económica. Os britânicos compraram um quinto das obrigações gregas. Se a Grécia entrar em incumprimento os incobráveis terão um severo impacto tanto no sistema bancário britânico como em qualquer outro europeu.
É também muito elucidativa a resenha que Will Hutton faz das causas subjacentes à debilidade das estruturas financeiras gregas. Portugal, em grande parte, pode ver-se ao espelho ali naquele retrato.
Há dias, Krugman, num artigo que transcrevi também na íntegra aqui, afirmava que "o que está realmente por detrás da euroconfusão não é o esbanjamento dos seus políticos mas a arrogância das suas elites, especificamente das elites políticas que levaram a Europa a adoptar uma moeda única muito antes de estarem reunidas as condições necessárias a essa acção." Quase a concluir esse artigo, Krugman, afirma que "o único caminho a seguir é o caminho em frente: para que o euro possa funcionar a Europa tem de avançar para uma união política, de modo que as nações europeias passem a funcionar de forma idêntica à dos Estados Unidos da América. " Para terminar dizendo que não acredita, no entanto, que esse seja o caminho que os europeus vão adoptar.
Discordo de Krugman.
Primeiro, porque, se ele pensa, e eu concordo nesse ponto com ele, que dificilmente a Europa vai evoluir dentro de pouco tempo para uma federação de estados idêntica aos EUA, quando as circunstâncias parecem empurrar fortemente nesse sentido, como é que poderiam reunir-se as condições que ele considera necessárias na ausência de qualquer compromisso inicial? Se o casal não casa e a mulher está grávida como é que casaria se nem namorassem?
.
Por outro lado, a comparação com os EUA não me parece a mais adequada. Diz Krugman que, no caso de uma crise económica provocada pelo rebentamento de uma bolha especulativa como aconteceu em Espanha, a solução para uma ocorrência idêntica na Flórida teria o respaldo dos fundos federais norte-americanos. Teria até certo ponto. A Califórnia debate-se com sérios problemas já há alguns anos e a ajuda federal não tem fluído como pretenderia o Governador Schwarzenegger.
A entreajuda tem os seus limites e os custos da irresponsabilidade de uns não podem ser impostos a outros. Mesmo uma Federação, mesmo uma Nação até, não sobrevive sem disciplina que obrigue a comportamentos sociais que sustentem a coesão. Alberto João Jardim tem obtido o que quer porque usa sistematicamente a chantagem mas mesmo esta não é sustentável ad eternum. Um dia a papa acaba.
.
Também sou partidário deuma solução federalista mas não penso que essa seja a panaceia para a solução dos problemas europeus, do euro, e muito particularmente para os nossos.
Don´t laugh at Europe´s woes. The travails facing Greece are also ours
Will Hutton The Observer
.
British schadenfreude has reached new heights of delicious self-indulgence. There is feverish market speculation that Greece will default on its debt, leave the euro and create a eurozone crisis as other members are pushed by the markets into following. It just proves that the euro is and was a disaster, the thinking goes. Thank God Britain did not join, runs the chorus from right to left, proving once again how wise the sceptics were and how foolish were those (like Will Hutton) who urged entry. Gordon Brown was careful as he answered questions before the European Summit last week to say Greece was an issue only for members of the euro. Britain would stay on the sidelines – gloriously uninvolved and independent from any possible expensive bail out. He was a financial Neville Chamberlain. I half expected him to come back in a twin-engine de Havilland proudly waving a paper – no bailouts and no euro membership in our time.
However, Greece and Germany are not far-away countries of which we know little. Our interdependence is a growing economic and political reality. Britain owns a fifth of Greek bonds; if Greece defaults, the write-offs will impact on our banking system as severely as any other in Europe. We also have no interest in Greece triggering a wave of exits from the euro and the 1930s-style competitive devaluations that will follow. Those dreaming of the free-market utopia of floating exchange rates should be careful for what they wish. By now you might hope there might be just a grain of suspicion about the manias and panics of free financial markets. Hope in vain.
It is worth engaging in a thought experiment. Any monetary regime in Europe has to deal with the reality of living alongside the world's most successful and, until China pipped it in 2009, largest exporter – Germany. Either there is the hard deutschmark, a world reserve currency second only to the dollar, against which the rest of Europe consistently devalues, or the euro. Up against the deutschmark, Greece would certainly be devaluing now – but so would Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Austria, Holland and probably France. When the financial crisis struck most of them would have been in a similar, if less acute position to Iceland. There would have been a flight from their money markets to Frankfurt and New York. Who thinks Greece, Belgium, Ireland and Austria would not have had an unstoppable bank run? Or could have survived it? There would have been no co-ordination within a world reserve currency zone to bail out stricken banking systems. There would have been no enjoying 1% euro interest rates. No capacity to increase government borrowing to weather the crisis. Europe would have had a bank-run induced slump – and the contagion would have hit Britain hard. It would, simply, have been a variant of 1931.
Or there is what we have. The euro has been a brilliant shock absorber. Icelandic politicians were as eurosceptic as our know-nothing political class – until disaster struck. Faced with the Hobson's choice of permanent economic stagnation, or adjustment within the euro zone and some light at the end of the tunnel, they have plumped for the latter. It is one of the reasons Greece will fight so hard to stay inside the euro; life is even more intolerable outside. If Greece leaves, its new independent currency will collapse; its interest rates will soar; its public debts will become unfinanceable; it really will default on its debt as it has so frequently in the past. It will slide back into being a failed state – with a military coup one all too possible response to the crisis.
It faces no choice but to reform. Greece has been so plundered by its super-rich elite of bankers and ship owners, so fully bought into the conservative doctrine that taxation is a form of coercion akin to slavery, that in key respects it is not a functioning state. The shadow, non tax-paying part of its economy is 30% of the total. Most middle-class professionals – lawyers, accountants and surgeons – insist on being paid in cash to avoid tax. Uncollected tax runs at 13.6% of national output per year – more than the deficit. The civil service is over-manned and corrupt. Everyone mercilessly tries to profit at someone else's expense. Of course Greece falsified its finances for qualification for entry to the euro zone. In this culture you tell the truth only to family. Revealingly, Mr Papandreou is the third member of his family to become prime minister.
There is no national consensus over what constitutes a just distribution of reward and obligation. As a result, its institutions don't function – as the European Commission team assembled at the behest of EU heads of states, backed by officials from the IMF, will soon discover. They will forensically examine how tax is not collected, how pensions are used as patronage and how statistics are rigged – and find a mess. Yet they and the Greek government will have to be careful. There is a mood in Greece ready to reform; witness the proposals to lift the pension age to 63. But if the elite is allowed to go free while the rest of society suffers, there will be revolt from below. Offend norms of fairness and societies risk disintegration and violence – something British politicians might ponder as they compete with visions of public sector wage freezes while allowing private sector salaries at the top to grow explosively.
This adjustment is an imperative – but so are two more. Germany's reluctance to offer an unconditional bailout to Greece is more than understandable, and the European deal – some support but only after reform has been shown to be implemented – is within its terms fair enough. Greece's problem is as much political as economic. But if Greece cannot devalue, and if there are social limits to how much it can lower wages, it needs some leeway somewhere . It needs more buoyant markets for Greek goods in the rest of the EU, and in Germany in particular. Chancellor Merkel wants it every which way. She wants no bailouts, a strong euro and Germany to carry on being an export machine. All three are not possible. Germany must boost its demand at home and loosen its purse strings if Greece– and the other weak states – are ever going to get out of trouble.
And there is a last reform. The financial markets invented toxic credit default swaps (CDS) – allegedly insurance against bond default which the markets could buy and sell – in the deregulatory mania of the last decade. But England banned trading insurance policies in which nobody took responsibility for paying insurance as the worst form of financial depravity in the 18th century. Now the practice is back as "innovation", except we know after Lehmans that the contracts are as worthless as they were under George I. However, hedge funds love them because they are such a juicy tool with which to speculate. It has been the CDS market that has prompted such a rapid confidence collapse in Greece. As they currently work, they should be banned.
The struggle to reform Greece and find a system of economic governance to make the euro work is all of Europe's battle, notwithstanding Gordon Brown at his evasive worst. If it is lost, we all go down. Western societies were served an awesome warning of the risks contemporary civilisation is running by allowing the rich to make the rules and ignore their obligations. If fairness is put at the heart of the reform programme – both within Greece and between Germany and the rest of Europe – there is a sporting chance of success. If not, the next decade could be very unpleasant indeed.
British schadenfreude has reached new heights of delicious self-indulgence. There is feverish market speculation that Greece will default on its debt, leave the euro and create a eurozone crisis as other members are pushed by the markets into following. It just proves that the euro is and was a disaster, the thinking goes. Thank God Britain did not join, runs the chorus from right to left, proving once again how wise the sceptics were and how foolish were those (like Will Hutton) who urged entry. Gordon Brown was careful as he answered questions before the European Summit last week to say Greece was an issue only for members of the euro. Britain would stay on the sidelines – gloriously uninvolved and independent from any possible expensive bail out. He was a financial Neville Chamberlain. I half expected him to come back in a twin-engine de Havilland proudly waving a paper – no bailouts and no euro membership in our time.
However, Greece and Germany are not far-away countries of which we know little. Our interdependence is a growing economic and political reality. Britain owns a fifth of Greek bonds; if Greece defaults, the write-offs will impact on our banking system as severely as any other in Europe. We also have no interest in Greece triggering a wave of exits from the euro and the 1930s-style competitive devaluations that will follow. Those dreaming of the free-market utopia of floating exchange rates should be careful for what they wish. By now you might hope there might be just a grain of suspicion about the manias and panics of free financial markets. Hope in vain.
It is worth engaging in a thought experiment. Any monetary regime in Europe has to deal with the reality of living alongside the world's most successful and, until China pipped it in 2009, largest exporter – Germany. Either there is the hard deutschmark, a world reserve currency second only to the dollar, against which the rest of Europe consistently devalues, or the euro. Up against the deutschmark, Greece would certainly be devaluing now – but so would Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Austria, Holland and probably France. When the financial crisis struck most of them would have been in a similar, if less acute position to Iceland. There would have been a flight from their money markets to Frankfurt and New York. Who thinks Greece, Belgium, Ireland and Austria would not have had an unstoppable bank run? Or could have survived it? There would have been no co-ordination within a world reserve currency zone to bail out stricken banking systems. There would have been no enjoying 1% euro interest rates. No capacity to increase government borrowing to weather the crisis. Europe would have had a bank-run induced slump – and the contagion would have hit Britain hard. It would, simply, have been a variant of 1931.
Or there is what we have. The euro has been a brilliant shock absorber. Icelandic politicians were as eurosceptic as our know-nothing political class – until disaster struck. Faced with the Hobson's choice of permanent economic stagnation, or adjustment within the euro zone and some light at the end of the tunnel, they have plumped for the latter. It is one of the reasons Greece will fight so hard to stay inside the euro; life is even more intolerable outside. If Greece leaves, its new independent currency will collapse; its interest rates will soar; its public debts will become unfinanceable; it really will default on its debt as it has so frequently in the past. It will slide back into being a failed state – with a military coup one all too possible response to the crisis.
It faces no choice but to reform. Greece has been so plundered by its super-rich elite of bankers and ship owners, so fully bought into the conservative doctrine that taxation is a form of coercion akin to slavery, that in key respects it is not a functioning state. The shadow, non tax-paying part of its economy is 30% of the total. Most middle-class professionals – lawyers, accountants and surgeons – insist on being paid in cash to avoid tax. Uncollected tax runs at 13.6% of national output per year – more than the deficit. The civil service is over-manned and corrupt. Everyone mercilessly tries to profit at someone else's expense. Of course Greece falsified its finances for qualification for entry to the euro zone. In this culture you tell the truth only to family. Revealingly, Mr Papandreou is the third member of his family to become prime minister.
There is no national consensus over what constitutes a just distribution of reward and obligation. As a result, its institutions don't function – as the European Commission team assembled at the behest of EU heads of states, backed by officials from the IMF, will soon discover. They will forensically examine how tax is not collected, how pensions are used as patronage and how statistics are rigged – and find a mess. Yet they and the Greek government will have to be careful. There is a mood in Greece ready to reform; witness the proposals to lift the pension age to 63. But if the elite is allowed to go free while the rest of society suffers, there will be revolt from below. Offend norms of fairness and societies risk disintegration and violence – something British politicians might ponder as they compete with visions of public sector wage freezes while allowing private sector salaries at the top to grow explosively.
This adjustment is an imperative – but so are two more. Germany's reluctance to offer an unconditional bailout to Greece is more than understandable, and the European deal – some support but only after reform has been shown to be implemented – is within its terms fair enough. Greece's problem is as much political as economic. But if Greece cannot devalue, and if there are social limits to how much it can lower wages, it needs some leeway somewhere . It needs more buoyant markets for Greek goods in the rest of the EU, and in Germany in particular. Chancellor Merkel wants it every which way. She wants no bailouts, a strong euro and Germany to carry on being an export machine. All three are not possible. Germany must boost its demand at home and loosen its purse strings if Greece– and the other weak states – are ever going to get out of trouble.
And there is a last reform. The financial markets invented toxic credit default swaps (CDS) – allegedly insurance against bond default which the markets could buy and sell – in the deregulatory mania of the last decade. But England banned trading insurance policies in which nobody took responsibility for paying insurance as the worst form of financial depravity in the 18th century. Now the practice is back as "innovation", except we know after Lehmans that the contracts are as worthless as they were under George I. However, hedge funds love them because they are such a juicy tool with which to speculate. It has been the CDS market that has prompted such a rapid confidence collapse in Greece. As they currently work, they should be banned.
The struggle to reform Greece and find a system of economic governance to make the euro work is all of Europe's battle, notwithstanding Gordon Brown at his evasive worst. If it is lost, we all go down. Western societies were served an awesome warning of the risks contemporary civilisation is running by allowing the rich to make the rules and ignore their obligations. If fairness is put at the heart of the reform programme – both within Greece and between Germany and the rest of Europe – there is a sporting chance of success. If not, the next decade could be very unpleasant indeed.
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