EUROPÂNICO

O incansável Krugman não desiste de juntar argumentos às suas posições contra as políticas prosseguidas  na Zona Euro com reflexos negativos na União Europeia, na Europa, e na economia mundial. Com o decorrer do tempo, a anemia que se instalou na Europa tem vindo a confirmar o acerto do seu diagnóstico das consequências perversas da terapêutica determinada pela corrente alemã. 

Hoje, Europanic 2.0, aqui.
Krugman não é o único a denunciar o desconcerto europeu. Mas é, claramente, o mais persistente.

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Anyone who works in international monetary economics is familiar with Dornbusch’s Law:

The crisis takes a much longer time coming than you think, and then it happens much faster than you would have thought.

And so it is with the latest euro crisis. Not that long ago the austerians who had dictated macro policy in the euro area were strutting around, proclaiming victory on the basis of a modest uptick in growth. Then inflation plunged and the eurozone economy began to sputter — and perhaps more important, everyone looked at the fundamentals again and realized that the situation remains extremely dire.

Now, things looked very dire in the summer of 2012, too, and Mario Draghi pulled Europe back from the brink. And maybe, just maybe, he can do it again. But the task looks much harder.

In 2012, the problem was very high borrowing costs in the periphery — which we now know were driven more by liquidity issues than solvency concerns. That is, the markets basically feared that Spain or Italy might default in the near term because they would literally run out of money — and market fears threatened to turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. And all it took to defuse that crisis was three words: “Whatever it takes”. Once the prospect of a cash shortage was taken off the table, the panic quickly subsided, and at this point both Spain and Italy have historically low borrowing costs.

What’s happening now, however, is very different. It’s a slower-motion crisis, involving the euro area as a whole, which is sliding into a deflationary trap with the ECB already essentially at the zero lower bound. Draghi can try to get traction through quantitative easing, but it’s by no means clear that this could do the trick even under the best of circumstances — and in reality he faces severe political constraints on what he can do.

What strikes me, also, is the extent of intellectual confusion that remains. Germany still seems determined to regard the whole thing as the wages of fiscal irresponsibility, which not only rules out effective fiscal stimulus but hobbles QE, since it’s anathema for them to consider buying government debt.

And it’s remarkable, too, how the logic of the liquidity trap remains elusive even after six years — six years! — at the zero lower bound. Not the worst example, but I read Reza Moghadam today:

Wages and other labour costs are simply too high, even by the standards of rich countries, let alone emerging markets competitors.

Augh! If it’s external competitiveness you’re worried about, depreciating the euro is what you want, not wage cuts. And cutting wages in a liquidity-trap economy almost surely deepens the slump. How can this not be part of what everyone understands by now?

Europe has surprised many people, myself included, with its resilience. And I do think the Draghi-era ECB has become a major source of strength. But I (and others I talk to) are having an ever harder time seeing how this ends — or rather, how it ends non-catastrophically. You may find a story in which Marine Le Pen takes France out of both the euro and the EU implausible; but what’s your scenario?