A HORA DA VERDADE

Hoje, paira no ar uma convicção generalizada que só não é oficialmente admitida porque ainda não chegou o momento em que a evidência não pode ser mais disfarçada: a Grécia, e não só, não tem a mínima possibilidade de pagar o que deve nas condições que aceitou par ser resgatada e, pela mesma razão, o bailout que foi aprovado esta semana é um paliativo que apenas prolongará a agonia.

A imposição de medidas de austeridade que excedem a capacidade de serem suportadas pelos mais atingidos por elas, obrigam a procurar os principais responsáveis - os bancos - pela embriaguez resultante da liquidez que irresponsavelmente entregaram sem cuidar do risco envolvido. E exigir-lhes que reconheçam o óbvio nos seus balanços: os activos que contabilizam não têm a consistência dos valores que apresentam. 

É isto que, por outras e mais palavras, defende o insupeito a este respeito Economist num artigo publicado esta semana que transcrevi aqui. Que acrescenta: Os bancos têm de recuar e esse recuo tem de ser organizado para que não redunde numa ameaça que pode destruir o sistema e lançar o mundo numa crise de consequências incalculáveis.

Também venho apontando neste caderno há muito tempo em sentido idêntico. Mas, mais que obviamente, a mim ninguém ouve.  Espero, no entanto, firmemente, que pensem muito atentamente no que escreve o Economist, entre outros igualmente reconhecidos.

É indiscutível que a responsabilidade pelo desastre (chamar-lhe crise é eufemismo) não é exclusiva dos bancos: os gregos, mas também os portugueses, e etc., gastaram inconscientemente muito mais do que deviam, os governos compraram, irresponsavelmente, criminosamente até, os votos dos povos com dispêndios incontidos, mas os banqueiros são os primeiros responsáveis porque, conscientemente, suportando-se na inimputabilidade que o sistema, no modo como está arquitectado lhe consente (moral hazard) concederam crédito pela ganância extrema de encherem os bolsos.  

E, até agora, nenhuma parte dos custos lhe foi assacada. Chegou a hora deles.

REESTRUTURAR: UMA INEVITABILIDADE

Why another Greek bailout is a stupid idea

 by Michael Schuman

The entire financial world was watching Athens today to see whether or not the Greek government would survive a no-confidence vote. Thankfully, it did. More importantly, the government now has to push a new slate of severe austerity measures through parliament next week to try to control its escalating debt. If the package gets rejected, further bailout funds may not flow, and Greece would rapidly spiral towards a default with bond payments coming due next month. That would also probably dash Greek hopes for a second bailout, currently being debated by the leaders of the euro zone. So a lot is riding on next week's vote in Athens – the Greeks economic future, the direction of the European debt crisis, and perhaps even the viability of the monetary union.

But despite all of the potential consequences, I've come to believe that further bailouts for Greece are just plain idiotic, for everyone involved – creditors, the euro zone, or the Greeks. Here's why:

First, the bailouts are not actually making it any more likely that Greece will be able to pay its debts back. Perhaps just the opposite. The bailouts are trying to solve Greece's debt problem with debt. The talk is that a proposed second EU bailout could total as much as 120 billion euros. Taken together with last year's 110 billion-euro rescue, the combined bailouts could add up to a remarkable 100% of GDP. With mandated budget cuts, tax hikes and other austerity measures eating into the country's growth potential, the combination of a stagnant economy and unresolved high debt levels is not going to convince any investor to trust his or her money with the government in Athens.

That's especially because no one can trust Athens to follow through on its reform pledges. Even if the austerity package passes parliament on Tuesday, is it politically possible to implement it? Will politicians eventually cave to anger on the streets? Can the government even survive in the face of such opposition? There is no way investors can be convinced that the government in Athens will hold up its side of the bargain, and thus no way to convince private investors to have faith in further EU bailouts. In fact, continued EU aid may actually be undercutting Greek reform efforts rather than energizing them. In a very interesting analysis of the Greek political situation in The Wall Street Journal, Takis Michas makes the point that those political forces that gain from resisting EU-mandated austerity programs – public sector unions and opposition parties – have no incentive to join in reform since they believe the EU will continue to bail out Greece under any circumstances to protect its creditors. In other words, as long as the Greeks know the gravy train is coming, they have less reason to accept reform.

So this all leads us to another reason a second Greek bailout is idiotic. If creditors will continue to have doubts about Greece's ability to reform and pay them back, then the new bailout scheme simply can't work. At the insistence of the European Central Bank, the new bailout is based on the assumption is that bondholders will “voluntarily” choose to participate in a debt rollover -- to reinvest their money in new, long-term Greek bonds when their original holdings come due. But without confidence in the Greek economy, what sane person would choose to take on long-term Greek debt? Maybe big European commercial banks will “volunteer,” to put off carving a hole in their balance sheets, or due to pressure from political authorities. But everyone else? An insightful story in The Financial Times quoted Gary Jenkins, head of fixed income at Evolution Securities, as saying: “I can't see why anybody would want to roll over a Greek bond if they had a choice. I can't see private investment funds being willing to do this.” So without private sector support, the entire bailout scheme crumbles, and we're looking at a possible default at some point in the future anyway.

Or more bailouts. The EU's solution to Greece's problems is effectively substituting privately held debt for publicly held debt. But is that sustainable? Not really. Greece needs to woo back private investors, but the current bailout system is not making that happen. That means Greece either defaults or becomes a perpetual welfare recipient. But the latter option will not be politically acceptable in Europe. At some point voters and their representatives in countries forced to foot the bill, like Germany and France, are going to say enough is enough and refuse to continue funding Athens.

And then what? However you slice it and dice it, Greece's debt is unsustainable, and the bailout process being employed to fix the problem is equally unsustainable. So let's just stop wasting everybody's time and restructure Greece's existing debt. That would achieve various ends. A debt restructuring will adjust the Greek debt load in a way that gives the government more time to reform, eases the immediate pain to the economy and improves the chances the economy can return to growth. That doesn't mean the Greeks will be let off the hook – painful austerity and public-sector reform are unavoidable under any scenario. But a restructuring would make the reform process more politically palatable in Greece, and thus make it more likely that Greece will be able to pay back its remaining debt. In other words, a debt restructuring will begin the process of restoring confidence in the Greek economy.

What of contagion fears? Well, whether we have an ill-conceived second bailout that no one believes will work or a restructuring/default, we'll be looking at contagion to other weak euro zone economies. At least a restructuring would clear up the uncertainty hanging over European bond markets. And creditors should take their lumps. Anyone silly enough to give the Greeks their money, knowing the state of its feeble finances, deserves to lose out. Perhaps some financial institutions will take a hit, especially Greek banks, which may require a bailout of their own if losses got too big. But a one-off recapitalization of some banks is better than keeping Greece on life support indefinitely. And with private sector creditors finally participating in resolving the euro debt crisis, politicians in Berlin and Paris will have an easier time justifying helping out Greece with more aid if necessary.

And what do we lose with a debt restructuring? Investors would put more pressure on the other bailed-out economies of the euro zone – Portugal and Ireland – as well as on Spain, fearing they could get hit with further losses on those nations' bonds. Perhaps, then, a Greek debt restructuring may make it more likely that other euro zone countries will need further bailouts or worse. But borrowing costs for these countries have been going up anyway due to the uncertainty surrounding Greece, while the reform of these weak economies has to speed along whatever happens in Athens.

So it's time the leaders of Europe bow to the inevitable, restructure Greek debt and deal with the fallout. Is there any other way?

À ESPERA DE UM CORTE DE CABELO

Caro H.,

A opinião de Robert M Fishman seria merecedora de mais crédito se fosse menos alinhada: Ao afirmar que a política adoptada não é passível de críticas (Domestic politics are not to blame), Fishman colocou a sua isenção de parte.

Porque, Caro H., o que é que pretende Fishman com esta análise? Denunciar as agências de rating e o perigo que representam para os regimes democráticos? É uma bela intenção, que eu também subscrevo, que não leva a lado nenhum. Porque o sistema financeiro, que tu conheces muito melhor que eu, até porque nele tens feito praticamente toda a tua carreira, continuará a assobiar para o ar. O sistema não se regenera com opiniões didácticas. Está provado que é suficientemente resistente mesmo a um abalo de elevada intensidade. Por outro lado, ao optar por uma observação lisonjeira da nossa realidade, esquecendo-se das nossas debilidades estruturais, da forma tonta como convivemos desbragadamente com o euro, do nosso crescimento mais que débil, da política errada de investimentos sem retorno adequado, do direccionamento dos recursos para os sectores protegidos da concorrência, da embriaguez da economia na construção e obras públicas, na perspectiva vesga da banca em geral e do banco do Estado em particular, que se tem limitado a seguir na cauda do rebanho a calcar-lhe a caca deixada para trás, na anedótica situação da justiça, do analfabetismo que deveria envergonhar-nos, etc., etc., etc.

Mas contenhamos-nos, agora, apenas no título da crónica: Portugal:Um resgate desnecessário (Portugal’s Unnecessary Bailout).

Desnecessário, porquê?

Só seria desnecessário se pudéssemos evitá-lo recorrendo a uma alternativa menos gravosa e, já agora, menos vergonhosa. Havia alternativa? Aparte o fuzilamento das agências de rating, por exemplo? Podemos, e devemos, revoltar-nos contra as agências de rating mas isso não tirará de cima de nós a espada de Damocles.

Robert M. Fishman também não diz como, o que é pena.

Todos nós sabemos que há outra alternativa e que é apenas uma questão de tempo paraa ela ser posta em prática: o reescalonamento da dívida. É por demais evidente que a banca não quer sequer ouvir isso. Mas sabe que ela é, mais tarde ou mais cedo, inevitável.

Só paga quem pode, meu caro H. E nós sabemos que não vamos poder aguentar a carga que nos colocámos em cima. E os investidores, a banca, também sabem. É por isso que carregaram nos juros, à espera do hair cut.

Vai ser complicado, mesmo com as mensagens dos 47, e dos 77*, e dos faroleiros, e de muitos outros que acordaram tarde demais.

O título não condiz com o texto e o texto é-nos lisonjeiro demais. Quanto ao resto, subscrevo.

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*O 7 persegue-nos. 
Teixeira dos Santos afirmou que se as taxas de juro atingissem os 7%, seria de encarar o pedido de ajuda externa. Foi uma declaração desastrada. A partir daí estava feito o convite à valsa uma vez que o tango tinha dado o que tinha a dar. Depressa os juros galgaram os 7% e não pararam de crescer.  Não seria, todavia, a declaração mais desastrada de TS. A declaração mais desastrada observada no hemisfério Norte, segundo o insuspeito António Costa, seria feita pelo mesmo TS na sequência da aprovação do PEC 4 em Bruxelas antes deste ser conhecido em Lisboa. 
Passados poucos dias, já ninguém fala disso: as desastradas declarações de TS foram, entretanto, desastradamente submergidas por um conjunto de declarações de Passos Coelho & Companhia (ou da Companhia de Passos Coelho?).
Pior, é impossível.

UMA AJUDA DESNECESSÁRIA?

Portugal’s Unnecessary Bailout (aqui)
By ROBERT M. FISHMAN

PORTUGAL’S plea for help with its debts from the International Monetary Fund and the European Union last week should be a warning to democracies everywhere.

The crisis that began with the bailouts of Greece and Ireland last year has taken an ugly turn. However, this third national request for a bailout is not really about debt. Portugal had strong economic performance in the 1990s and was managing its recovery from the global recession better than several other countries in Europe, but it has come under unfair and arbitrary pressure from bond traders, speculators and credit rating analysts who, for short-sighted or ideological reasons, have now managed to drive out one democratically elected administration and potentially tie the hands of the next one.

If left unregulated, these market forces threaten to eclipse the capacity of democratic governments — perhaps even America’s — to make their own choices about taxes and spending.

Portugal’s difficulties admittedly resemble those of Greece and Ireland: for all three countries, adoption of the euro a decade ago meant they had to cede control over their monetary policy, and a sudden increase in the risk premiums that bond markets assigned to their sovereign debt was the immediate trigger for the bailout requests.

But in Greece and Ireland the verdict of the markets reflected deep and easily identifiable economic problems. Portugal’s crisis is thoroughly different; there was not a genuine underlying crisis. The economic institutions and policies in Portugal that some financial analysts see as hopelessly flawed had achieved notable successes before this Iberian nation of 10 million was subjected to successive waves of attack by bond traders.

Market contagion and rating downgrades, starting when the magnitude of Greece’s difficulties surfaced in early 2010, have become a self-fulfilling prophecy: by raising Portugal’s borrowing costs to unsustainable levels, the rating agencies forced it to seek a bailout. The bailout has empowered those “rescuing” Portugal to push for unpopular austerity policies affecting recipients of student loans, retirement pensions, poverty relief and public salaries of all kinds.

The crisis is not of Portugal’s doing. Its accumulated debt is well below the level of nations like Italy that have not been subject to such devastating assessments. Its budget deficit is lower than that of several other European countries and has been falling quickly as a result of government efforts.

And what of the country’s growth prospects, which analysts conventionally assume to be dismal? In the first quarter of 2010, before markets pushed the interest rates on Portuguese bonds upward, the country had one of the best rates of economic recovery in the European Union. On a number of measures — industrial orders, entrepreneurial innovation, high-school achievement and export growth — Portugal has matched or even outpaced its neighbors in Southern and even Western Europe.

Why, then, has Portugal’s debt been downgraded and its economy pushed to the brink? There are two possible explanations. One is ideological skepticism of Portugal’s mixed-economy model, with its publicly supported loans to small businesses, alongside a few big state-owned companies and a robust welfare state. Market fundamentalists detest the Keynesian-style interventions in areas from Portugal’s housing policy — which averted a bubble and preserved the availability of low-cost urban rentals — to its income assistance for the poor.

A lack of historical perspective is another explanation. Portuguese living standards increased greatly in the 25 years after the democratic revolution of April 1974. In the 1990s labor productivity increased rapidly, private enterprises deepened capital investment with help from the government, and parties from both the center-right and center-left supported increases in social spending. By the century’s end the country had one of Europe’s lowest unemployment rates.

In fairness, the optimism of the 1990s gave rise to economic imbalances and excessive spending; skeptics of Portugal’s economic health point to its relative stagnation from 2000 to 2006. Even so, by the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007, the economy was again growing and joblessness was falling. The recession ended that recovery, but growth resumed in the second quarter of 2009, earlier than in other countries.

Domestic politics are not to blame. Prime Minister José Sócrates and the governing Socialists moved to cut the deficit while promoting competitiveness and maintaining social spending; the opposition insisted it could do better and forced out Mr. Sócrates this month, setting the stage for new elections in June. This is the stuff of normal politics, not a sign of disarray or incompetence as some critics of Portugal have portrayed it.

Could Europe have averted this bailout? The European Central Bank could have bought Portuguese bonds aggressively and headed off the latest panic. Regulation by the European Union and the United States of the process used by credit rating agencies to assess the creditworthiness of a country’s debt is also essential. By distorting market perceptions of Portugal’s stability, the rating agencies — whose role in fostering the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States has been amply documented — have undermined both its economic recovery and its political freedom.

In Portugal’s fate there lies a clear warning for other countries, the United States included. Portugal’s 1974 revolution inaugurated a wave of democratization that swept the globe. It is quite possible that 2011 will mark the start of a wave of encroachment on democracy by unregulated markets, with Spain, Italy or Belgium as the next potential victims.

Americans wouldn’t much like it if international institutions tried to tell New York City, or any other American municipality, to jettison rent-control laws. But that is precisely the sort of interference now befalling Portugal — just as it has Ireland and Greece, though they bore more responsibility for their fate.

Only elected governments and their leaders can ensure that this crisis does not end up undermining democratic processes. So far they seem to have left everything up to the vagaries of bond markets and rating agencies.

Robert M. Fishman, a professor of sociology at the University of Notre Dame, is the co-editor of “The Year of the Euro: The Cultural, Social and Political Import of Europe’s Common Currency.”

BÓNUS E ESCÂNDALOS

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A formidável segunda vida dos bónus da banca

Afinal, a banca de investimento soma lucros e segue próspera. A regulação muda vírgulas. Os mercados cavalgam uma nova bolha. E já se instala na dormência colectiva a resignação de que pouco mudará no sistema financeiro. Os contribuintes olham para isto com cara de parvos - talvez porque os tomem por tal.O que há um ano foi esconjurado está este ano já jurado: vai voltar a acontecer e mais depressa do que o diabo esfrega o olho. O facto de a banca de investimento se preparar para ter os seus melhores lucros de sempre significa que pouco se aprendeu e que muito se perdeu: perdeu-se a oportunidade de mudar a regulamentação a sério. Enquanto isso, os gestores destes bancos vão ter um Natal dourado com bónus vertiginosos.

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continua

IDA E VOLTA

BURACO NEGRO

BURLÃO E CIRURGIÃO

NACIONALIZAÇÕES

NEO-SUICIDAS

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With all due respect Mr. President, that is not true.

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"Notwithstanding reports that all economists are now Keynesians and that we all support a big increase in the burden of government, we the undersigned do not believe that more government spending is a way to improve economic performance. More government spending by Hoover and Roosevelt did not pull the United States economy out of the Great Depression in the 1930s. More government spending did not solve Japan’s “lost decade” in the 1990s. As such, it is a triumph of hope over experience to believe that more government spending will help the U.S. today. To improve the economy, policymakers should focus on reforms that remove impediments to work, saving, investment and production. Lower tax rates and a reduction in the burden of government are the best ways of using fiscal policy to boost growth"

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O "CATO INSTITUTE", clube dos radicais liberais, publicou ontem (publicidade paga, em página inteira ) nos principais jornais norte-americanos a mensagem que atrás transcrevi.

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Do fanatismo dos seus membros, o "cartoon" de Toles diz tudo.

INSANITY IS

tocar na imagem para aumentar

A imagem que transcrevo do Washington Post de hoje procura dar uma ideia das enormes reduções dos valores de capitalização dos principais bancos norte-americanos, europeus e japoneses entre meados de 2007 e ontem, e ilustra um artigo - Treasury Moves to Restrict Lobbyists From Influencing Bailout Program - acerca da questão do momento: Que medidas (e como, e em que quantidade) podem parar a espiral para o abismo em que o sistema financeiro embarcou?

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E, naturalmente, agora mais que nunca, as pressões junto dos decisores governamentais por parte daqueles, ou dos seus representados, que perderam o controlo da situação por culpas próprias, é enorme. Até onde poderão ir as cedências aos infractores sem que essas cedências sejam pagas pelos contribuintes em geral, que estão isentos de culpas? É esse o nó górdio que não se pode desatar sem riscos gerais.

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"American taxpayers deserve to know that their money is spent in the most effective way to stabilize the financial system," Geithner said in a statement yesterday. "Today's actions reaffirm our commitment toward that goal."

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A procura do melhor caminho passa sempre pelo contributo dos contribuintes. Se passa, e não parece haver outra via, não deveria o sistema mudar de mãos? Porque não?

Anteontem, foi notícia que os accionistas do Barklays recusaram a nacionalização e as cotações subiram num só dia 70%. Há alguma razão para considerar a valorização de uma empresa cotada, financeira ou não financeira, a partir da cotação de um dia? Alguém acredita que uma intervenção massiva na bolsa em substituição dos bailouts deixaria as cotações sem reacção fortemente positiva? Até agora, os bailouts têm-se afundado em poços sem fundo.

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"Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again, expecting different results" - Albert Einstein.

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Provadamente, este caminho não leva a lado nenhum. Escolham outro.